REBUILDING AFRICA'S SCIENTIFIC CAPACITY IN FOOD AND AGRICULTURE by Eicher, Carl K.
Staff Paper
REBUILDING AFRICA’S SCIENTIFIC CAPACITY IN
FOOD AND AGRICULTURE 
by
Carl K. Eicher
Staff Paper 2004-12 August 2004
Department of Agricultural Economics
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
East Lansing, Michigan  48824 
MSU is an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution 
 
 
REBUILDING AFRICA’S SCIENTIFIC CAPACITY IN FOOD 



























*Background Paper No. 4 was commissioned by the InterAcademy Council (IAC) Study 
Panel on Science and Technology Strategies for Improving Agricultural Productivity and 
Food Security in Africa. The Panel has made use of the paper in its deliberations but its 
publication does not necessarily imply endorsement by the Panel or the IAC, nor does the 
author necessarily endorse the IAC Panel report. Research for this paper, was supported by 
the W.K. Kellogg Foundation and the IAC. 
 
** Carl K. Eicher is University Distinguished Professor Emeritus, Department of 
Agricultural Economics, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan. 
 
Copyright © 2004 by Carl K. Eicher. All rights reserved. Readers may make verbatim 
copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that this 




I.  The Second-Generation Challenge  
 
II.  The Agricultural Knowledge Triangle  
 
III.  Agricultural Research and Extension: Capacity-Building Issues 
 
IV.  University Development: Expansion, Retrenchment, and Reform  
 
V.  The Second-Generation Challenge: Bread-and-Butter Issues  
 
VI.  Looking Ahead: The Need For a Strategic Paradigm  
 





REBUILDING AFRICA’S SCIENTIFIC CAPACITY IN FOOD 




“The built-in incentives that characterize agricultural research in most low-income countries are 
bad. All too often, agricultural scientists are worse off than high-class clerks in the bureaucracy of 
the government” 
-Nobel Laureate T.W. Schultz 1984  
 
From 1987 to 1997, agricultural higher education received 2 percent and agricultural research and 
extension 98 percent of the World Bank’s $4.8 billion of global investments in agricultural education, 
research, and extension. 
A.Willett 1998 
  
The vision of a new society in Africa will need to be developed in Africa, born out of the 
African historical experience and the sense of continuity of African history. 
  -J.F. Ade Ajayi, 1982 
 
 
I. The Second-Generation Challenge 
 
A decade ago, then-World Bank Vice President E.V.K. Jaycox identified the lack of administrative, 
managerial, and scientific capacity as the weak link in African development, and he urged the Bank 
and other donors to launch a number of capacity-building initiatives (1989). Jaycox was not the first 
to voice such concerns. Two decades earlier, the role of education as a contributor to capacity-
building and national development was vividly laid out by Julius K. Nyerere in his paper “Education 
for Self-Reliance” (1967). Nyerere dissected the shortcomings of the colonial education system and 
called for a new model of “education for self-reliance and development.” In the same year, Professor 
Thomas R. Odhiambo published his visionary article “East Africa: Science for Development” (1967), 
which called for coordination of national and regional science policies in East Africa and urged 
African governments to dramatically increase their investment in science education—starting in 
primary schools. These prescient insights remain largely unfulfilled, however. The past 40 years of 
debates about education and capacity-building have amounted to little more than empty promises and 
false starts; Africa’s human-capital potential, which had been insidiously suppressed under the 
colonial system, is still suppressed. 
 
To be sure, African countries have made great strides. Universities have increased in number, and 
student enrollment has risen at all levels. Nevertheless, universities throughout the continent are   4
facing severe financial problems, coupled with a decline in the quality of the educational experience 
and an exodus of senior academics to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the private sector, and 
attractive international positions (Lynam and Blackie 1994). But the brain drain, especially at the rank 
of professor and associate professor,
 1 has been crippling African universities that are trying to build 
M.Sc. and Ph.D. programs. Senior scholars are needed to set the research direction and intellectual 
tone of their departments, and they are ultimately responsible for the mentoring of graduate students 
and the overall quality of their programs of study and research. 
 
The first generation of African agriculturalists performed yeoman’s service starting in the 1960s. 
They helped launch new universities and faculties of agriculture, and they tackled research—
particularly on food crops and livestock for small holders—that had been neglected in colonial 
export-oriented research stations. In 1960, roughly 10 percent of the agricultural researchers in Africa 
were African, and the balance were expatriates. Thirty years later, those proportions had reversed—
90 percent were African (Beintema et al. 1998). This was an impressive achievement, facilitated by a 
generous flow of scholarship money for overseas M.Sc. and Ph.D. training programs. 
 
But at present the first generation of African agriculturalists has by and large retired, and the second 
generation of researchers and teachers is demoralized not only by poor conditions of service but the 
low rate of return of many young academic staff members on overseas training programs. Moreover, 
Africa’s human capital is being ravaged by the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Without question, the second-
generation crisis in the African scientific community is severe, it is not amenable to a quick fix, and it 
bodes ill for the future. African scholars and researchers, with their unacceptably low salaries and 
inflation-riddled retirement programs, outmoded scientific infrastructure, and thin operating budgets, 
are poorly prepared to train the third generation of agricultural scientists.  
 
What can be done to rebuild and re-energize the second generation? One way is to introduce lower-
cost degree programs through sandwich courses, distance education, and the increased use of 
information and communications technology (ICT). Another is to increase the number of scholarships 
for overseas study, especially at the Ph.D. level.  
 
But overall, Africa’s second generation challenge calls for an institution-building initiative 
comparable to the human-capital-improvement initiatives that were launched in Malaysia, Brazil, 
                                                 
1 The loss of senior academics is dramatized at Egerton University in Kenya. In 1998, there were only 
six senior faculty (professors and associate professors) out of 135 members of the Faculty of   5
Thailand, Indonesia, and India in the early 1960s and steadfastly implemented for two decades (Lele 
and Goldsmith 1989).
2  Moreover, the severity of the situation requires a strategic national-regional-
global effort, in place of the present country-by-country and project-by-project approach, to building 
a strong agricultural science base within Africa. Meanwhile, African governments and the donor 
community need to devote more attention to the political reforms that are a prerequisite for university 
reforms. A massive institution/capacity-building program must be grounded in the political fabric of 
Africa because, at the end of the day, the people who occupy the state house are of overarching 
importance in either building or destroying a modern scientific community. The success in Mali and 
Uganda and the painful events in Liberia and Zimbabwe speak to this point.  
 
This background paper is organized as follows: Part I introduces the second-generation challenge. 
Part II lays out the basic issues and illustrates how the concept of an “agricultural knowledge 
triangle” helps us to examine investments in agricultural higher education, research, and extension. 
Part III reviews the problems facing national agricultural research and extension systems, which are 
the largest employer of agricultural graduates. Part IV addresses university development. Part V 
outlines some practical steps for meeting the second-generation challenge. Part VI discusses strategic 
issues involved in looking ahead, and Part VII presents a number of recommendations to the IAC 
Panel. 
                                                                                                                                                   
Agriculture’s academic staff (Eicher, 1999, p.40). 
2See Lele and Goldsmith (1989) for an analysis of India’s development of human capital in 
agriculture. India sent about 1000 scientists overseas for M.Sc. and Ph.D. degrees in agriculture in 
the 1960s and 1970s, and the nation built 31 new state agricultural universities. (A few states have 
more than one university.)   6
II. The Agricultural Knowledge Triangle 
 
Specialists in institution-building have recommended a “systems approach” for coordinating 
investments in three basic and interlinked agricultural areas: research, extension, and higher 
education. This approach has been variously called an “agricultural knowledge system” (Roling, 
1988), “agricultural-knowledge information system” (AKIS) (FAO and the World Bank, 2000), and 
“agricultural knowledge triangle” (Eicher, 1999). These three key pillars of research, extension, and 
higher education, being complementary investments, should be systematically planned and 
sequenced—with communication, interaction, and cooperation between their practitioners—rather 
than treated as separate activities. And because they are risky at early stages of economic 
development and have long-term payoff, the government rather than the private sector is usually the 
main investor; government investments in research produce public goods such as new technology that 
generate spillovers and benefit more than one generation or socioeconomic group.  
 
But instead of investing in the three pillars as an integrated system, most donors in Africa, daunted by 
its administrative difficulty within their present infrastructures, have pursued a pillar-by-pillar or 
project-by-project approach. “The agricultural divisions [at the World Bank] have no responsibility 
for universities, which are the responsibility of the education divisions,” says a former extension 
specialist at the Bank. “It is not therefore surprising that the bank projects in extension and research 
do not provide support to higher agricultural education” (Venkatesan, 1991). 
 
This piecemeal approach to institution-building has often created poorly sequenced, dysfunctional, 
oversized, and generally unsustainable agricultural institutions in Africa. In practice, the AKIS 
framework has been a toy rather than an operational tool, and most donor agencies are dubious about 
seriously financing agricultural-education projects. For example, the World Bank made only three 
such loans in sub-Saharan Africa from 1987 to 1997 (Willett 1998), even though the Bank prides 
itself on being a “knowledge organization.”  
 
One cause of this disparity is the lack of political savvy among potential recipients. The faculties of 
agriculture at most African universities tend to remain on the fringes of the subregional research 
organizations (ASARECA [Association for Strengthening Agricultural Research in Eastern and 
Central Africa], CORAF [Conseil Ouest et Centre Africain pour la Recherche et le Développement 
Agricoles], and SACCAR [Southern African Centre for Cooperation in Agricultural Research and 
Training]). Nor do they hold annual meetings to display their members’ research findings to the donor   7
community or their countries’ ministries of agriculture, higher education, or finance. By contrast, the 
“agricultural research lobby” is skilled at courting and generating donor support. Without question, 
the creation of the CGIAR (Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research) system in the 
early 1970s, followed by ISNAR (International Service for National Agricultural Research), SPAAR 
(Special Program for Agriculture in Africa), SROs (subregional organizations), and FARA (Forum 
for Agricultural Research in Africa), represent a well-oiled machine that skillfully makes the case for 
investment in research (Eicher and Rukuni 2003).  
 
What can universities do to emulate the agricultural research lobby? The World Bank’s preparation of 
MAPP (Multi-Country Agricultural Productivity Program) for Africa presents a window of 
opportunity (World Bank 2003), with some US$1.7 billion earmarked for agricultural research and 
extension in Africa over the next five years. Although the MAPP concept paper does not presently 
include funds for strengthening agricultural higher education in Africa, NEPAD (New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development) should perhaps be deployed to lobby the Bank for the purpose of including 
that function. 
 
Sadly, national governments often have idiosyncratic priorities and actively resist real coordination as 
much as donors do. As a result, a comprehensive approach to building agricultural knowledge 
systems will not be forthcoming until African scientists, educators, and extension specialists seize the 
initiative and provide leadership in crafting country-specific agricultural knowledge systems (Rukuni, 
Blackie, and Eicher 1998). They must sell this integrated institution-building approach to the political 
leaders in their respective developing countries and then to donors. Finally, deans of agriculture need 
to become agricultural entrepreneurs and build political support both among farmers at home and 
foundations and other donors elsewhere in the nation, region, and world.  
 
The ultimate goal of building a system of three interacting pillars rather than investing in one at a 
time is “connectivity” between the complementary institutions and a reward structure that encourages 
managers, scientists, and academicians to communicate and cooperate with each other (even when 
they individually report to different ministries). Such an effective agricultural knowledge triangle will 
increase agricultural productivity and—through lower food prices, food security, income generation, 
and employment—the welfare of all members of society (Bonnen 1998).   8
III. Agricultural Research and Extension: Capacity-Building Issues 
 
Beliefs That Have Shaped the Design of Rural Institutions 
 
It is important to acknowledge several flawed beliefs about development that were strongly held in 
the early 1960s and that continue to thwart institutional innovation and the growth of the private 
sector to this day. They help to explain why it has been so difficult to craft country-specific, 
interactive, and financially sustainable African agricultural institutions: 
 
At independence, most African leaders believed that the state—not the private sector—should be the 
central planner, financier, entrepreneur, and risk-taker in generating jobs and “bringing development 
to the people.” The highly centralized Training and Visit (T&V) extension model that was introduced 
in Africa in the late ’70s was compatible with this prevailing view of the state’s starring role in top-
down development planning. However, this miscasting has diminished in many countries since the 
’80s because of a plethora of failed state farms, processing plants, and grain-storage facilities. 
 
The second belief concerns the inexorability of time and the presumed talent of African nations to 
skip stages of development and speed up institution-building through large infusions of foreign aid. 
Back in the ’60s, most African leaders articulated a vision of leapfrogging certain critical steps and 
becoming modern industrial nations in one generation. But capacity-building is an accretionary 
process that unfolds slowly and almost invisibly over a period of decades. EMBRAPA (the Brazilian 
Agricultural Research Corporation), which is the NARS (National Agricultural Research System) of 
Brazil, is now being lionized for its sterling research, but it should be kept in mind that Brazil has 
been independent for almost 200 years! The University of Bombay conferred its first Ph.D. in 
economics in the mid-1930s; while the University of Ibadan, the first university in Nigeria, was not 
established until 1948. Even under the most favorable conditions, Southern nations in general and 
African nations in particular cannot be expected to develop globally competitive human-capital 
capacity—say, in biotechnology—virtually overnight.   
 
The third belief that accompanied independence was that one model of extension, food production, or 
university could be introduced, scaled up, and sustained throughout Africa. Various candidates have 
been introduced, including T&V extension, land-grant universities, and the Sasakawa Global 2000 
(SG 2000) food-production model that was based on the success of the Green Revolution model in 
Asia (Eicher 1989). The land-grant model fizzled in the 1980s and the T&V extension model was   9
quietly abandoned in the late 1990s after the World Bank had aggressively promoted it in some 30 
African countries.  
 
The fourth belief is that developing countries should be encouraged to spend as much on agricultural 
research as industrialized countries. In the 1960s and ’70s, for example, African governments were 
encouraged to spend one to two percent of their agricultural GDP on agricultural research—the same 
level as in the North. Fortunately, this simple guideline is no longer used in most donor circles 
because of the realization that money is not a substitute for time in building scientific capacity.  
 
The fifth belief—another contributor to the preparation of large and unsustainable projects in 
Africa—is the uncritical use of high-rate-of-return estimates based on studies in industrialized and 
Asian countries. Such assessments provide little guidance on the future financial and scientific 
viability of an African NARS.   
 
Agricultural Research: Insights and Challenges 
 




Who Is in the State House? 
The lack of political commitment in the state house is the biggest single obstacle today to building 
strong and productive NARS in Africa. To be sure, foreign aid can serve as a “handmaiden,” but it is 
no substitute for political leadership, time, and learning by doing. Developing a science-based 
agriculture, in short, is an indigenously led and accretionary process. And it must begin at the 
country’s political level, as occurred in China when the State Council issued a decree to pursue a new 
round of radical reforms for creating a modern, responsive, internationally competitive, and fiscally 
sustainable research system (Huang et al. 2003).  
 
There is also a need for aggressive decompression of many countries’ core agricultural services in 
order to improve their performance and raise participating scientists’ salaries and benefits. The goal 
of such decompression is to develop an efficient and productive NARS that can be financed primarily 
from national resources. Meanwhile, donors have an important obligation to assist in this process by   10
providing bridging funds; excessive and erratic donor aid has been a major contributor to the current 
crises in many NARS in Africa. For example, the decompression process is now underway at the 
Kenya Agricultural Research Institute, with the assistance of the European Union and World Bank in 
collaboration with Kenya’s Ministry of Finance. At the end of the day, downsizing should be viewed 
as part of a process of searching for a new NARS paradigm that features partnerships with NGOs, 
universities, and the private sector in the organization and provision of agricultural research, 
extension, and higher education. 
 
Foreign Aid 
A radical rethinking is urgently needed on how Africa can best organize itself to take advantage of the 
world’s rapid scientific progress. Africa’s scientific community clearly cannot flourish if it continues 
to be heavily dependent on erratic foreign aid for 40 percent or more of the budget of its NARS. The 
challenge is for NARS managers and scientists/entrepreneurs to develop retrenchment programs (in 
cooperation with ministries of finance and donors), spin off some commodity research programs to 
producer groups, generate additional revenue through producer levies, pursue contract research and 
alliances with the private sector and foundations, and generate revenue from the commercialization of 
NARS products and services (Echeveria and Elliott 2002). 
 
Sustainability 
At present, economists do not have a practical appraisal tool for determining what size NARS a 
borrower should aim for and what the indicators of success are for achieving long-term scientific and 
financial sustainability. There is a dearth of information on how to analyze the borrower’s long-term 
capacity to sustain its NARS without donor support. Because the issue of sustainability is masked in 
the early years, when donors pay a large share of the project, many NARS have added hundreds of 
scientists without realizing that once the infrastructure is built the main cost of research will be 
salaries.  
 
Building Biotechnology Capacity 
Kenya, Zimbabwe, and South Africa boast strong national commitments to biotechnology research. 
And Ethiopia has prepared a 20-year biotechnology strategy, set up an agricultural technology 
research coordination office within EARQ (Ethiopian Agricultural Research Organization), and 
prepared a plan to develop an Agricultural Biotechnology Research Institute (Zeweldu 2001). But 
                                                                                                                                                   
3 For a discussion of research in the colonial period see McKelvey 1965 and Eicher 1989; 
postcolonial period see Lynam and Blackie 1994. Also see Gora Beye (2002) for a comprehensive   11
other African nations are at an early stage of biotechnology research, even where one might have 
expected otherwise. For example, at independence in 1957 Ghana was one of the most economically 
advanced nations in Africa, yet today it does not have a coordinated national effort in biotechnology. 
 
The biotechnology revolution is being driven by a wide range of highly specialized knowledge, both 
new and traditional. Also, the dividing line between agricultural and non-agricultural sciences is 
becoming blurred. As a result, agricultural researchers will need to draw on the traditional knowledge 
and breeding techniques of plant breeders, the work of scientists in faculties of agriculture, and 
additional new knowledge from such sources as molecular biologists, specialists in environment, law, 
commerce, and social science, and private biotechnology and multinational seed and fertilizer firms. 
A major challenge for all these players is in the pragmatic, day-to-day details. For example, the 
managers of NARS and deans of agriculture in Africa must figure out how their separately governed 
research and teaching institutions can best cooperate, beginning with the decision of where a 
biotechnology research center should be located—on a university campus or at a NARS? 
 
 
Agricultural Extension: Searching for a New Paradigm 
 
General Issues 
Agricultural extension is vital to the diffusion of new technology. Yet extension is currently moribund 
in many African nations. Kenya has 12,000 extension agents but lacks operating funds to buy 
gasoline for its motorbikes. Zimbabwe recently merged its research and extension services, but inter-
service rivalries (and impediments) remain.  
 
The extension dilemma can only be understood in historical perspective: three models have 
dominated extension debates in Africa since independence. First the “quantitative model” was 
introduced in the 1960s by Western experts who assumed that new technology from temperate 
climates could be more rapidly transferred to Africa and diffused to farmers if the number of 
extension agents was dramatically increased. African governments collectively hired 36,000 new 
extension agents (increasing their number from 21,000 to 57,000) over the 1959 to 1980 period (Judd 
et al. 1986). However, this model collapsed because of poor management, a lack of new technology 
to extend, and problems of financing the expanded system. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
assessment of the impact of foreign aid on the development of NARS in Africa.   12
The second model of extension was the T&V (Training and Visit) model. This was a highly 
centralized mechanism—propagated by a former Director of Extension in Israel who helped the 
World Bank introduce it in Turkey in the late 1960s and later in India—that attempted to improve the 
management of national extension systems. The Bank introduced the T&V model in Africa in the 
’80s and helped extend it to some 30 African nations, with Kenya as the testing ground for measuring 
its performance. A recent Bank study concluded, however, that “the performance of the T&V system 
as applied in Kenya has been disappointing. The system as implemented has been ineffective, 
inefficient, and unsustainable” (Gautam, 1999). The rise and fall of T&V extension in Africa offers a 
sobering example of the failure of an imported model that was aggressively promoted in Africa 
without pilot projects, independent Africa-wide evaluations, or attention to its fiscal sustainability. 
Today, African agriculturists are more seasoned and less gullible; they would not accept the 
proposition that one extension model can serve the diverse needs of the continent’s 48 countries. 
 
A third extension model—the privatization model—is now being pilot-tested in Mozambique and is 
in the early stages of implementation throughout Uganda (Nahdy et al. 2002). Five factors are driving 
the intense interest in this model:  
 
•  Many of the national extension programs are starved for operating funds because of 
reduced Ministry of Agriculture budgets.  
•  After 10 to 20 years of experience with the T&V model, many extension experts realize 
that these donor-financed schemes were too large to be financed by African governments 
once the foreign aid was phased out. 
•  Private extension has been effective for export crops where farmers are taxed to finance 
both research and extension.  
•  Many village and church groups in Africa have already set up their own extension 
networks to fill the vacuum created by the collapse of the T&V model.  
•  Private extension is spreading in industrialized countries such as the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, and the United States.  
 
Nevertheless, some tough questions need to be addressed in the current debate on the privatization of 
extension, especially in countries where the average per-capita GDP is one or two dollars a day. 
Under such circumstances, can farmers really be asked to contribute to the “care and feeding” of a 
private extension agent? Unless there are some examples of countries in which the poor have 
successfully bought their way out of poverty, donors should step in and offer grants to African   13
governments to help underwrite the start-up costs of private extension. After three years of debate 
over alternate extension models, Uganda’s Parliament approved a National Agricultural Advisory 
Development Service (NAADS) Act in 2001, which established the institutional framework for the 
creation of a private extension model. This model will use pooled funding from the World Bank and 
other donors, which will flow to the nation’s treasury and down to the districts, sub-counties, and 
farmers’ organizations. They will then use the funds to negotiate contracts with former extension 
agents or NGOs to provide extension services to local farmers (World Bank 2001).  
 
Extension Experiments in Mozambique 
Many academics and donor specialists have endorsed the general prescription of a new extension 
paradigm that embraces decentralization, participation, outsourcing (contracting), and cost recovery 
with the goal of reducing both the size of the government bureaucracy and public outlays on 
extension. But despite its appeal, this should not become the specific prescription for any particular 
country in Africa. The challenge for each African government is to design its own models of 
extension, and this requires innovative leadership, pilot studies, and careful monitoring and evaluation 
with respect to local specifics. 
 
Mozambique is playing a leading role in southern Africa by experimenting with its own extension 
models (Gemo, Eicher, and Teclemariam 2003). Although Mozambique became independent in 1975, 
public extension was not institutionalized as a separate directorate within the Ministry of Agriculture 
until 1987; and because of the civil war, this National Directorate of Rural Extension (DNER) did not 
become operational until peace was declared in 1992. DNER is a relatively lean and embryonic 
organization with a total of 639 public extension workers to serve three million small holders, and it 
is currently pursuing a learning-by-doing approach (Eicher 2002).  
 
There are three types of extension providers in Mozambique: in addition to the public entity (DNER), 
there are NGOs (international and local) and private firms (especially for cotton and cashew), for a 
total of 1300 extensionists. The basic question for policymakers is how to build a Mozambican 
extension system that is not only pluralistic but fiscally sustainable in an environment where donors 
are influential (they are financing the bulk of the Ministry of Agriculture’s budget) and yet there is a 
prevailing atmosphere of movement toward privatization, concurrent with the downsizing of public 
extension. 
   14
Several insights flow from Mozambique’s attempts to craft its own models. The first is that 
international NGOs represent a proven way of delivering extension services in Mozambique. Some of 
this success is attributable to a generous flow of foreign aid, hiring the best local people, and working 
in circumscribed high-potential project areas. However, the international NGOs that depend on 
foreign aid for the bulk of their financing are unlikely to be financially sustainable as foreign aid dries 
up. One can make a case for donors to gradually shift their financial support from international NGOs 
to local NGOs. 
 
The second insight is that global experience suggests it is more difficult for extension reforms to 
reduce the total public expenditure on extension than it is to develop a pluralistic system of extension 
providers. Even in Chile, a middle-income country, public expenditures on extension are still 85 to 90 
percent of the total extension budget after 22 years of experimentation (Berdegue and Marchant 
2002). Therefore Mozambique’s Ministry of Agriculture should assume that even if an array of NGO 
and private extension-service providers emerge over time, the government will most likely be the 
main financier of extension for decades to come. 
 
The third insight is that privatization is premature in many African countries, which often have 
limited market participation, weak institutions, poor roads, and modest private-sector involvement in 
input delivery and marketing.  
 
   15
IV. University Development: Expansion, Retrenchment, and Reform 
 
It’s a plain fact that poor countries cannot pay as much for education as rich countries can. 
Consequently, poor countries have to establish much clearer educational priorities, both in terms of 
quantity and quality; these decisions necessarily involve some hard choices, especially for higher 
education.  
 
University development in Africa can be examined by dividing its recent history into three phases: a 
vigorous expansion phase in the 1960s and ’70s, when universities performed brilliantly in increasing 
the output of undergraduates (Ajayi, Goma, and Johnson, 1996); a retrenchment phase in the ’80s, 




Three strategies have been used to try to expand and strengthen agricultural education in Africa over 
the past four decades. The first was the introduction of the U.S. land-grant university model, with its 
triple mission of research, extension, and teaching. Several U.S. universities, with support  from the 
USAID (U.S. Agency for International Development), helped set up a number of new universities in 
Africa that embodied some of the land-grant ideas. But the research and extension missions of the 
land-grant model were typically in conflict with the entrenched research and extension departments in 
Ministries of Agriculture. By the l980s, most of the new African land-grant universities were 
converted into all-purpose institutions with emphasis on undergraduate teaching (Johnson and Okigbo 
1989, Hansen 1990 and Eicher 1999).  
 
The failure of the land-grant model in Africa prompted delegations from Nigeria and Tanzania to visit 
India in the early ’80s and study India’s innovative state agricultural university (SAU) model, in 
which vice chancellors report to the Ministry of Agriculture rather than to the Ministry of Higher 
Education; in that way, the connectivity between research, extension, and agricultural higher 
education is increased. Nigeria subsequently set up three federal universities of agriculture based on 
the Indian model, but they all experienced difficulties (Idachaba 1999). For its part, Tanzania 
established the Sokoine University of Agriculture in 1984 by upgrading the Faculty of Agriculture at 
Morogoro into a higher-education institution with emphasis on agriculture, forestry, and veterinary 
medicine. Unfortunately, both the U.S. land-grant and the Indian state agricultural university models   16
have floundered in Africa, once again demonstrating that imported institutional models have a high 
failure rate. 
 
The second large university experiment was the 20-year global University Development Program 
financed by the Rockefeller Foundation from 1963 until 1983. Three African universities—Nairobi 
(Kenya), Ibadan (Nigeria), and Kinshasa (Democratic Republic of Congo)—participated in this 12-
country international effort aimed at helping universities become more effective in addressing some 
of the problems of development. However, the Foundation phased out the initiative early because of 
mixed results and unexpected political difficulties in a number of countries, including the Congo and 
Nigeria. Coleman and Court (1983) studied this experience and emphasized that to develop strong 
and sustainable postgraduate programs it typically takes a good deal of time, adequate infrastructure, 
a motivated and well-paid academic staff, and adequate indigenous financial support—little or none 
of which were available in these cases.   
 
The third institutional innovation in agricultural higher education is a proposal to mobilize African 
academic staff with advanced degrees to carry out agricultural research of mutual interest to NARS 
and faculties of agriculture (Mickelsen et al 2003). The motivation for this initiative comes from the 
fact that universities often have more Ph.D.s in agriculture than does the government research system. 
Thus competitive-grant schemes are now in operation—in World Bank-financed projects in Malawi, 
Kenya, Ghana, and many other countries (Echeverria and Elliott 2002)—to increase the ability of 
university scholars to carry out research. However, these funding schemes are often oversold and they 
are difficult to administer in small countries. Also, there have been many problems in “the 
NARS/university relationship.” Conflict and misunderstanding are common between the strong 
(NARS) and the weak (faculties of agriculture) (Castillo 1997). “At present,” an African university 




During the late 1980s and early ’90s, numerous critics argued that African universities were bloated, 
inefficient, and in need of downsizing. They also maintained that students should be required to pay 
fees and that universities should become more entrepreneurial in mobilizing funds from the private 
sector (Saint 1992). The critics also pointed out that the annual cost of higher education per student 
was substantially higher in Africa than in Asia or Latin America, which led to intense policy debates 
on how to reduce this cost (Birdsall 1996). A study by World Bank economist Psacharopoulos   17
(1994), whose calculatations suggested that primary education in Africa generates a higher social rate 
of return to society than do secondary and higher education, was also cited. In the aftermath of these 
and other criticisms, African universities experienced a fall from grace, both at home and among 
donors (Saint 1992). 
 
A retrenchment in donor support to agriculture and universities was especially severe. In 2002, the 
World Bank invested only eight percent of its total expenditures on agriculture, an all-time low. 
Donor funding was also curtailed for students studying agriculture in the North. For example, the total 
number of USAID postgraduate scholarships in the United States for students from developing 





An unexpected renewal phase has been initiated by a half-dozen African universities over the past 
few years. University reforms have included innovations such as the admission of private fee-paying 
students, faculty retention of a share of their consulting income, the introduction of night classes and 
private universities, and the use of ICT both in university administration and in the classroom (Court 
1999). These reforms did not take place in a vacuum, but were a product of larger political and social 
changes; Uganda and Kenya are prime examples of reforms that have become unblocked as a result 
of new leadership in the state house that is propelling the democratic transition (Lynam 2003). 
Meanwhile, many donors, such as the World Bank, appear to have have rediscovered universities 
over the past three or four years. For several decades the Bank gave priority to investments in primary 
education, but the Bank’s new leadership in human resources has warmly embraced investments in 
higher education, as described in its book Constructing Knowledge Societies: New Challenges. 
(World Bank 2002). Finally, a new USAID global initiative has recently been introduced to increase 
the number of scholarships for postgraduate study in agriculture in the United States and the number 
of capacity-building grants to help rebuild universities’ faculties of agriculture in developing 
countries (BIFAD 2003). 
 
Four U.S. foundations have played a critical role in supporting the renewal phase of African higher 
education. In 2000, the Rockefeller, Ford, Carnegie, and MacArthur Foundations launched the 10-
year Partnership for Higher Education in Africa. These foundations committed to spending $100 
million over the first five years to support universities in Uganda, Tanzania, Mozambique, South   18
Africa, Ghana, and Nigeria that are pursuing reforms. Four lessons have already been derived from 
the first three years of the Partnership’s experience:  
 
•  African self-initiated reforms. Many of the higher-education reforms are closely related 
to broader changes such as democratization, economic liberalization, decentralization of 
governance, and increased autonomy of (and experimentation with) public institutions.  
 
•  Time. The foundations report that it took about a year in each country for administrators 
and African scholars to develop business plans to reform their universities.  
 
•  Funding. The foundations spent $62 million in the first two years (2000 and 2001) in the 
six African countries. Graduate-training and capacity-building programs cannot be 
financed on a shoestring. 
 
•  Innovations in long-term training. Staff-development programs in the six Partnership 
universities are highly diverse. Some include traditional overseas Ph.D. programs while 
others have adopted the “sandwich” model, which enables young academic staff 
members to take their first year of graduate courses in their home universities, complete 
advanced coursework abroad (in the South or the North), and then return home to 
complete their thesis research. Still others are taking advantage of “virtual,” or distance-
education, degrees. And a few are experimenting with African-based graduate programs 
such as the African Economic Research Consortium’s Ph.D. program in economics (Fine 
1997).  
 
                                                                                                                                                   
4 This section draws on BIFAD 2003.   19
V. The Second-Generation Challenge: Bread-and-Butter Issues 
 
Building Africa-Based Graduate Programs  
Overseas training and technical assistance are second-best solutions for meeting Africa’s long-run 
human-resource needs in the agricultural sector. Technical assistance in particular is a useful stopgap 
measure, but unless it is coupled with the development of local training and research institutions, “a 
succession of expatriates learn more and more about developmental decision making while the 
Africans below them in the hierarchy become progressively more alienated and discontented. The 
experience and collective ‘memory’ which is accumulated during the process of development is thus 
appropriated by foreigners who subsequently leave the country, carrying these invaluable assets with 
them” (Helleiner, 1979). 
 
Part of the problem has been the paucity of Africa-based graduate programs, coupled with a sharp 
reduction in the number of scholarships that would enable Africans to pursue graduate study overseas. 
When the African Economic Research Consortium carried out a study of graduate education in 
economics in Africa, it found that “graduate training in any meaningful sense appeared to have 
collapsed in most African universities” because of the “lack of funds, civil disorder, loss of good 
staff, deteriorating faculties and equipment, and a massive expansion of undergraduate enrollment” 
(Fine 1997). Meanwhile, many donors and foundations have “pulled the plug” on overseas training. 
 
Special efforts must therefore be made to shore up the quality of M.Sc. and Ph.D. degree programs in 
Africa, and not only as a reaction to dwindling overseas opportunities. The fact is that even if donors 
paid the full cost of overseas training and it was of higher quality than local training, there would still 
be important advantages in emphasizing local graduate programs. First, the coursework in such 
programs is likely to better prepare students for careers in agricultural extension because the courses 
are grounded in national agricultural policies and local agro-ecologies, institutions, and farming 
systems. Second, the research of students in local graduate programs is more likely to focus on local 
and national problems than that of students in overseas universities, who often have no alternative but 
to pursue research on problems of industrialixed countries’ agriculture. Third, the incremental buildup 
of the quality of local graduate programs serves as an insurance policy, should a donor discontinue 
offering scholarships for overseas study.  
 
As mechanisms for Africa-based training are introduced or fortified, the debate over building regional 
centers of excellence vs. establishing regional specializations in graduate programs—a controversy   20
that has churned for decades—continues. On first blush, it seems that building new regional centers of 
excellence can help induce senior African professors to return from the diaspora. But building another 
layer of educational institutions can be risky, divisive, and expensive. Seasoned observers such as 
Canadian consultant Jeffrey Fine have made the case for donors to support self-initiated efforts to 
build “regional specializations” in existing universities, as opposed to their supporting regional 
centers of excellence. Examples of regional specializations include the newly launched Ph.D. Plant 
Breeding program at the University of Natal, the M.Sc. degree in Agricultural extension at Makerere 
University in Uganda, the M.Sc. in Natural Resource Management at the University of Pretoria, and 
the M.Sc. program in agricultural economics for East Africa at the University of Nairobi. 
 
Regaining African Scientists from the North? 
 
In response to the sharp cutback in long-term technical assistance from the North in the 1980s,
5 
several South-South, short-term, technical-assistance programs—such as the United Nations 
Development Programme’s TOKEN project (Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate 
Nationals)—have been established. Similarly, a number of African scientists have organized global 
networks to motivate African scientists living overseas to return to their home university for the 
purpose of teaching short courses and helping to raise funds.
6 Some observers argue for more 
ambitious programs. Buoyed by India’s and China’s successes in enticing nationals to return home 
permanently to pursue scientific and managerial careers, they have suggested that senior African 
agricultural professionals abroad might also be encouraged to return and help fill the human-capital 
gap. But can Africa really regain its scientists this way?  
 
The answer, I believe, is yes, but only regarding some of its expatriate scientists—and mostly among 
the relatively junior. We must acknowledge, first of all, that there is a global market for advanced 
human capital and that financial incentives are key to the migration of talent.
7 I have observed over 
                                                 
5 See Elliot Berg’s study of the rise of long-term technical assistance in the 1960s and1970s, and its 
decline in the 1980s (Berg 1993). 
 
6 For example, Ethiopia has developed a global network (GNEST 2003) of Ethiopian scholars who are 
living in the diaspora. Likewise, Friends of Njala University College in Sierra Leone is a network of 
Africans and non-Africans who are working to assist the rebuilding of the scientific infrastructure at 
Njala. 
 
7 Carrington and Detregiache (1998) report that “with regard to Africa, the biggest migratory flows to 
the US are from Egypt, Ghana, and South Africa. For these countries, over 60 percent of the migrants 
have a tertiary degree.” 
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the past 40 years of work in Africa that once African nations experience a major exodus of 10,000 or 
more scientists, managers, and teachers—following a civil war, coup d’état, or decades of economic 
stagnation (as in Ghana, Nigeria, Ethiopia, or Somalia)—it is very difficult to interest a substantial 
number of them into returning home, especially while their country of birth remains at a low-income 
status. To be sure, there are exceptions—India, a poor country, attracted some of its 40 million people 
in the diaspora to to its booming high-tech industry—but I have never seen the agricultural sector in a 
low-income county serve as a magnet to regain expatriate agricultural scientists.  
 
I believe we should focus on creative ways of making agricultural science and agribusiness attractive 
enough to young African scientists to entice them to return home permanently, but we cannot expect 
senior academics and researchers to do likewise other than on a short-term basis. To secure these 
young scientists’ interest, political and scientific leadership must develop an attractive package of 
monetary and non-monetary incentives such as start-up research grants and rapid career advancement. 
These kinds of components are key not only to luring back scientists from the diaspora but to 
preventing brain drain in the first place. 
 
History provides a valuable perspective on the symbiotic relationship between postgraduate training 
and incentives, the brain drain, and capacity-building in developing countries. Successful institution-
building experiences in Brazil, India, Malaysia, and Chile over the past 30 years reveals that young 
scientists on overseas graduate-training programs can be attracted to return home and pursue careers 
in the core agricultural institutions and private sector if they can benefit from research funding, 
attractive monetary and non-monetary incentives, and, importantly, a viable scientific infrastructure 
for effective and lasting academic partnership. Such infrastructure should include post-degree 
networking, mentoring, access to the global scientific literature, sabbatical leave, and participation in 
national and regional workshops on development policy, management, and research topics (BIFAD 
2003). 
 
An American soil scientist recently commented on his experience in trying to get his postgraduate 
students to return to Africa: “The critical issue is having a professionally rewarding environment as a 
means of attracting postgraduates to return to Africa and stay. There also needs to be assurances that 
the home country will indeed hire them. In many countries the work environment has improved 
greatly (the advent of email/Internet/computer data analysis gets over many of the problems of 
isolation and enables them to remain current and get something done in spite of institutional 
constraints) but still has a long ways to go. The successful graduate needs access to a postdoc/early-  22
career package of start-up money for lab equipment and support to attend international 
meetings/workshops.”  
 
Reforming the Incentive Structure for Scientists and Teachers: Country Studies 
 
Malaysia: When Malaysia became independent in 1957, its per-capita income of US$350 was the 
same as Ghana’s. Since then, Malaysia has diversified from its historic emphasis on rubber research 
to include oil palm and food crops, and has increased the number of agricultural researchers from 100 
to 1000. In 1988, research officers had access to low-interest loans to purchase a house or a car, a gift 
of a free airplane ticket to Mecca, and, as a capstone for working as a scientist until the retirement age 
of 55, a free around-the-world air ticket. Today, Malaysia has a strong public and private research 
system, which has been mainly financed by the government because the country has always been 
reluctant to accept foreign aid. 
 
China: A decade ago, a typical noodle seller outside the entrance to a Chinese agricultural research 
station was earning more than a Ph.D. scientist inside. But with China’s rapid rate of economic 
growth of (8 percent per year) in the 1990s and a change in science policy, the country created an 
economic base for attracting and rewarding good scientists, both from overseas and within China. The 
country’s Academy of Agricultural Sciences has adopted a salary scale that is midway between 
Chinese local salaries and U.S. salaries—and similarly for benefits. In the late ’90s, China placed a 
fraction of its 80,000 agricultural scientists into a category called the “innovation base”—including, 
that is, the most talented among them—and raised their salaries and benefits some 500 percent. More 
generally, new staff members receive a housing allowance, and researchers are allowed to accept 
domestic/international consulting assignments for two to three months per year (Huang, Hu, and 
Rozelle 2003). China now has a formidable scientific research base. 
 
Mozambique: Currently, there are several dozen international NGOs in Mozambique with 
considerable scope and independence, and their staff’s salaries and benefits are roughly double those 
of comparable posts in the Ministry of Agriculture (Eicher 2002). This intentionally wide salary gap 
has been responsible for a constant migration of government talent to the NGOs. The Ministry of 
Agriculture still has about 7,200 employees at present but is implementing a decision to reduce that 
number by about 1500, largely through early retirements. Red tape and bureaucratic hurdles has 
slowed the pace, but a US$750 one-time bonus is being given to encourage them to speed targeted 
staff’s withdrawal from the system. The total cost, $650,000, is being paid for by pooled funding   23
from about a dozen donors. Phase II, underwritten by similar sources and costing $4 million, consists 
of offering an early-retirement package to 900 workers who will be eligible in the near future. The 
Mozambican experience illustrates how the government and donors are working together to reduce 
the size of the Ministry, while raising the salaries and benefits of those remaining.  
 
Brazil: Brazil has a long history of public-research programs for farmers; its first was initiated about 
150 years ago (Ruttan, 1982). In 1972, the nation set up EMBRAPA (the Brazilian Agricultural 
Research Corporation) to coordinate its national research program—including a human-capital 
improvement program, which has become one of the most impressive in the developing world. 
EMBRAPA was aided by a set of USAID-financed collaborative agreements, established in 1963 
between four Brazilian and four U.S. counterpart universities, to fortify undergraduate agricultural 
higher education in Brazil. After a decade of success, the contracts were extended another four years 
to strengthen postgraduate education. During that period and beyond, EMBRAPA spent about 20 
percent of its total budget on various training programs in Brazil and abroad; today it is an outward-
looking entity with over 1,500 alliances with local, regional, and international organizations. In 
particular, EMBRAPA and Brazil’s state universities and private sector are deeply involved in 
developing new technology to support the expansion of agricultural exports (mainly coffee, soybeans, 
and sugar) and value-added activities such as the cultivation of gourmet coffee for overseas 
consumers. In 2001, the average salary for a senior scientist at EMBRAPA’s Tropical Cassava and 
Fruit Research Station was between US$14,500 and US$35,000 per year (Macedo etc 2002).  In 
Ghana, by contrast, the director of the government’s Cassava Research Program recently reported that 
the salaries for his researchers were “too low to quote” (Otto 2000). 
 
Reducing the Cost of Postgraduate Education
8 
 
Many donors have criticized overseas graduate training for African students because of its rising cost 
and low returnee rate. (Table 1 displays the total cost of M.Sc. and Ph.D. degrees in various 
universities around the world.) Further, they have called for African-led initiatives to experiment with 
new models of postgraduate training that will not only be lower-cost and more retentive of graduates 
but also allow developing countries to build sustainable linkages to overseas universities.  
 
                                                 
8 This section draws on BIFAD 2003.   24
Table 1. Costs of Graduate Degrees in Agriculture in Various Countries 
Degree Years University/Country Estimated  Total 
Cost 
Year 
     $US   
M.Sc.  2  U.S.  56,000  2003 (incl. out-of-
state tuition) 
M.Sc. 2  Australia  32,000  1998 
M.Sc. 2  Southern  Africa  31,000  1998* 
M.Sc.   2.5  Makerere, Uganda  25,000  1998 
M.Sc. 2  UPLB,  Philippines  24,000  1998 
M.Sc. 2  U  Malawi  18,000  1997 
Ph.D.  3  U.S. universities  90,000  2003 (incl. out-of-
state tuition) 
Ph.D.  3  Asian Inst of Technology 
(Thailand) 
40,000 2003** 
Ph.D.  3  University of Agriculture 
Bangalore (India) 
23,000 2003** 
Ph.D.  3  University of Natal (South 
Africa) 
55,000 2003 
Ph.D. 4  Belgium  ***  35,000  2003 
 
* Average total cost in four specializations (agronomy, animal science, land and water management, and 
agricultural economics) in four universities in Southern Africa (Anandajayasekeram et al 1996) 
**Suvedi (2003) 
***Tollens (2003). Four-year sandwich/fellowship program. The student spends one-third of his or her time 
in Belgium and two-thirds overseas. 
 
 
For example, the sandwich model has been pioneered by a number of universities in Europe as a 
means of lowering cost and increasing the returnee rate. A Ph.D. student takes a first year of 
postgraduate course at his or her home university and then goes overseas for 12 to 18 months of 
further coursework. The student then returns to the home university to do research and complete his 
or her thesis. Sandwich programs are increasing in popularity because of their reduced cost, increased 
international interactions, and advantages to the students’ home university and country.    25
  
In addition to cost-cutting sandwich models, there are other innovations for reducing the cost of 
postgraduate training. These include increased use of distance education and ICT (see below), 
summer institutes, and students’ “human-capital chains” via the Internet for keeping in touch with 
their thesis supervisors and maintaining ready access to the global scientific literature. 
 
ICT, Distance Education, and AGORA 
 
The four U.S. foundations (Rockefeller, Ford, Carnegie, and MacArthur) supporting the renewal of 
universities in six African countries (Uganda, Tanzania, Mozambique, South Africa, Ghana, and 
Nigeria) are including highly targeted information and communications Technology (ICT) programs 
that range from registration and financial management to library and research applications.  
Without question, there is significant potential for Web-based distance education, and a number of 
U.S. universities have already been offering courses and even degrees over the Internet. However, 
this is not yet a proven mechanism for granting degrees in most African countries (Till 2003).
9  While 
the World Bank-financed African Virtual University (AVU), which was established in 1997 to 
provide students in Africa with access to quality higher education in science and engineering, has 
offered courses it does not yet offer full degree programs. Another such effort is the program created 
by the Institute for Food Laws and Regulations at Michigan State University, which consists of six 
distance-education courses that are noted for their cost-effectiveness ($794 per course). Similalry, 
USAID’s DOT-COM Alliance and the investments of other donors will add substantially to the ICT 
infrastructure of developing countries. As this infrastructure grows, there will be more opportunities 
in Africa to test the benefits of providing local education electronically.  
 
Regarding access to the global scientific literature, a pioneering Rockefeller Foundation-financed 
project, The Essential Electronic Agricultural Library (TEEAL), has provided access to 140 journals 
on CD-ROM to 72 libraries in the developing world (42 of which are in Africa). TEEAL has been 
implemented over the past six years by Cornell University’s Albert R. Mann Library with great 
success. In September 2003, the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization will join forces with 
                                                 
9 Till (2003) summarizes his recent review of ICT in Africa as follows: "There has come to be a 
simplistic but widely held notion that ICTs will automatically benefit African education. The reality, 
however, is that ICTs can’t go it alone: quality assurance, provided by adequate human resource 
infrastructure, is an essential part of the equation. Regrettably, such infrastructure is presently 
inadequate to meet the demand for post-secondary entry to higher education across the region in 
most of Africa.”  
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Cornell and begin moving TEEAL to the Internet under the name AGORA (Access to Global 
Research in Agriculture). In this exciting development, the FAO has promised to provide global 
leadership for the AGORA project, which will offer free Internet access for scientists in developing 
countries. 
 
Improving Thesis Supervision 
 
African students pursuing M.Sc.’s in African universities often report that it takes them four to five 
years to complete a nominally two-year degree. The reason for such delays is the difficulty in finding 
a thesis supervisor who will mentor, nurture, and read draft manuscripts on schedule. A former 
professor at the University of Nairobi drew on his experience to suggest how to improve the situation: 
“There are many examples of joint thesis supervision and lecturing by NARS staff members, but it is 
through individual contacts and friendships,” he said. “This arrangement is unsustainable and needs to 
be institutionalized.” Contributions of NARS staff should “be formally recognized both by university 
and NARS, and be rewarded accordingly,” he added. “This should not only include monetary rewards 
but also be considerations in the promotion of the staff concerned. Again, this calls for a national 
research policy that spells out clearly the working relationships between NARS and universities.” 
 
Kenya: Case Study of Regional Training Programs 
 
One of the colonial institutions that has great staying power in Africa is the regional model of 
organizing agricultural research, networks, and university education. For example, regional training 
efforts are frequently mentioned as a way to drive down the unit cost of graduate programs. But the 
experience of the University of Nairobi illustrates the gap between theory and practice. With financial 
assistance from the government of Germany, the university launched in 1974 an M.Sc. program in 
agricultural economics for students from East Africa (Thimm 1992). The two-year program consisted 
of coursework during the first year and thesis research in the student’s home country during the 
second year. The program flourished during the ’70s but subsequently lost considerable steam; 
because of low salaries, funding constraints, and frequent university closures between 1985 and 1995, 
the Nairobi’s Department of Agricultural Economics lost eight staff members with Ph.D.s. And 
finally, given a lack of scholarships, the intake of students from East Africa all but dried up in the 
’90s, falling to three (all Kenyan) in 1997. This sobering case study of a 25-year effort (1974-1999) to 
build and sustain an M.Sc. degree program reveals that while it was relatively easy to garner foreign   27
aid to launch a regional M.Sc. program it was difficult to gain local political and financial support to 




1.  An indigenous and cost-effective human-capital renewal system is central to the long-run 
sustainability of African universities, research, and extension. Because of the cutback in 
foreign aid for overseas training, it follows that African universities are the only feasible 
institutions for training nationals in agriculture, science, and related fields. 
 
2.  The failure of policy reforms to speed economic recovery in Africa has created a growing 
awareness that efficient, reliable, and relevant institutions matter as much as policies for 
directly accelerating economic growth. Because African universities constitute a key 
element of the “agricultural knowledge triangle,” it is important to nurture and enhance 
them to assure their meaningful contribution to national development. 
 
3.  There is growing empirical support for the proposition that the accretionary and virtually 
invisible process of “learning by doing’ is an efficient way to build scientific and 
managerial capacity (Eicher 1989, 1990). 
 
4.  Many universities in Africa have more agricultural scientists with M.Sc. and Ph.D. 
degrees than are employed by the government. In 1995 in Eastern and Southern Africa, 
there were 547 African scientists with a Ph.D. in agriculture employed by universities 
and 357 in the NARS (Mrema 1997). 
 
5.  The academic staff and postgraduate students of African universities are valuable and 
cost-effective sources of agricultural innovation and achievement. Their work is 
complemented by contributions of scientists in the NARS, who often assist African 
universities by teaching postgraduate courses, mentoring, and serving as thesis co-
advisors.  
 
VI. Looking Ahead: The Need For a Strategic Paradigm 
Over the past four decades the “agricultural research lobby” has used a tactical paradigm, which 
emphasizes high returns to investment in research, rather than a strategic paradigm that would stress   28
the payoff of investments not only in research but concurrently in extension and agricultural higher 
education. The narrow focus on research alone is an unfortunate carry-over from the colonial model 
of emphasizing research on export food crops and failing to build universities to train future African 
scientists.  
 
Today, the World Bank’s agricultural-knowledge information system (AKIS) does emphasize the 
three pillars of research, extension, and agricultural higher education. But although AKIS is featured 
prominently on the Bank’s Website, it is not in MAPP—the Multi-Country Agricultural Productivity 
Program for Africa—that the Bank designed in cooperation with SPAAR, FARA, and the SROs to 
strengthen research and empower farmers, extension services, and agricultural advisory resources. 
MAPP is actually using a technocratic approach to strengthen only two of the pillars—research and 
extension. The bottom line, therefore, is that the MAPP proposal represents an incomplete and 
unsustainable model of technology generation and agricultural-productivity growth because 
consideration is not given to African universities and human-capital replenishment.  
 
The IAC Panel should urge the World Bank to replace the MAPP’s tactical paradigm with a systems 
approach. But the Panel will also have to convince the agricultural research lobby to include African 
universities in the MAPP action plan, both in substantive and financial terms.  
As an aid to doing so, we propose five innovations: 
  
•  In a small country, invest in a single faculty of agriculture to meet the training needs of 
the national market.  
 
•  In some small countries, invest in a single faculty that is serving as a supplier of talent 
both to national and regional markets. For example, 25 percent of the students enrolled in 
the faculty of agriculture at the University of Mali are from nearby West African 
francophone countries. The improvement of the scientific infrastructure of the University 
of Mali represents a cost-effective way to train undergraduate students in agriculture from 
the entire region. 
 
•  Offer competitive capacity-building grants to strengthen already-established M.Sc. 
programs in selected universities.  
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•  Reinforce Ph.D. programs in a few universities by helping to finance sandwich projects 
such as those at the Universities of Natal, Makerere, and Pretoria and at several 
institutions in the North.  
 
•  Set up a “fast track” disbursement system to assist in the recovery of universities in post-
conflict countries such as the Sudan, Sierra Leone, and Angola. 
 
We also propose that donors finance a series of summer institutes, which would be held in several 
locations in Africa and taught by visiting professors from around the world, in order to tap the global 
knowledge base. These institutes would provide an opportunity for visiting African and non-African 
scientists to interact with local colleagues, develop new professional partnerships, and stay abreast of 
the changing research problems in Africa. 
 
Because of the decline in the quality of M.Sc. degree training programs in many agricultural 
disciplines in African universities, there is a particular need for donors to make strategic investments 
in strengthening these programs. For example, over the past two years a committee representing 16 
agricultural-economics departments in 12 countries in eastern, central, and southern Africa has 
developed a proposal to offer a high-quality masters’ degree in agricultural and applied economics in 
Africa beginning in late 2004 or early 2005 (Oluoch-Kosura and Fine 2003). This African-led 
initiative should be carefully considered by donors because of the strong demand for well-trained 




1. Strategic  Paradigm. The IAC Panel should urge the World Bank, NEPAD, and FARA to 
adopt a strategic paradigm for building a strong agricultural science base in Africa. They 
should invest, that is, in each of the three pillars of the agricultural knowledge triangle.  
 
2.  The Second-Generation Challenge. I have argued that it will be extremely difficult to entice 
prominent African scientists from the diaspora to return home permanently as long as the 
agricultural sector is moribund there and civil strife is pervasive. But instead of trying to 
regain senior African scientists from abroad, policy attention should focus on improving the 
scientific infrastructure and increasing the financial incentives to encourage young African 
researchers and teachers to return home—or to remain in Africa in the first place. Meanwhile,   30
special efforts should be made to interest overseas African scientists, both junior and senior, 
in returning to their home countries for short periods to mentor young scientists and teachers. 
 
3. Political  Reforms. Because universities are the product of a larger political and social milieu, 
it follows that political reforms are essential to clearing the way for academic reforms. In 
Kenya, for example, the sharp increase in the number of public universities and faculties of 
agriculture over the past two decades could not have occurred until the recent democratic 
transition took place. Moreover, Kenya as well as Uganda have shown how political reforms 
unleash the entrepreneurial energy of the university community. But in my opinion, only 
about a third of the 48 countries in Africa currently have the political leadership, stability, and 
interest to pursue the political reforms necessary for rebuilding universities and faculties of 
agriculture. 
 
4.  The Land-Grant Model, with its tripartite mission, has been unsuccessful in Africa for many 
reasons, including its inability to build a political power base among farmers and break the 
colonial mold of entrusting the Ministry of Agriculture to carry out agricultural research and 
extension. Land-grant-type universities were successful in doing research and extension 
during a honeymoon period, while donor funds were available, but once this aid was gone the 
universities slowly turned into all-purpose teaching institutions. 
 
5.  Cost and Quality. There are numerous innovations (such as distance learning, ICT, and 
sandwich programs) to reduce the cost and enhance the quality of M.Sc. and Ph.D. training 
and increase the percentage of overseas graduate students who return home. 
 
6.  The Regional Imperative. Because many countries in Africa are small, it has been difficult for 
local universities to achieve a critical mass of teachers in areas such as biotechnology, 
international trade, food science, and agribusiness. We should recognize, then, that it would 
be unwise for tiny countries such as Eritrea, Togo, Benin, and the Gambia to try to train their 
B.Sc. students in these fields locally. Rather, they should send them to other countries in 
Africa for such training. For example, Eritrea is currently sending hundreds of 
undergraduates to South African universities. In general, I believe it’s necessary to turn to 
regional agricultural training models—which may be visualized as an ever-expanding pattern 
of concentric circles ranging from local to continental—for university degree programs that 
qualify students for public, private, and NGO employment in African agriculture.     31
 
Level I. Small Country. Typically there is one faculty of agriculture, with a 
curriculum focused on agronomy, plant science, livestock, and agribusiness, that 
trains students to work for the local government, NGOs, and private markets. The 
Faculty of Agriculture at the University of Botswana is a prototype institution of this 
type, and it produces high-quality graduates for Botswana. This model could be 
adapted in some other small African countries. One bilateral donor should be 
mobilized to assist the faculty for 15 to 20 years by investing in ICT, improving 
access to the global scientific literature, and encouraging participation in regional and 
global human-capital chains. (Although the Faculty of Agriculture in Botswana is 
currently funded by the government, in other small countries a single bilateral donor 
could be found to support a similar faculty.)  
 
Level II. Small country with regional training capacity. The Faculty of Agriculture at 
the University of Mali is a prototype Level II institution because it currently offers a 
five-year undergraduate degree and has 600 students enrolled, 150 (25 percent) of 
whom are from 11 other francophone countries. This faculty needs donor support for 
foreign-student fellowships and for providing salaries to visiting scholars and 
Malians on sabbatical leave. It also needs funds for modest capital improvements 
such as drilling a well on its teaching farm, installing a dedicated phone line for the 
Internet, and establishing library connection to AGORA. One donor is needed for 
each Level II country. 
 
Level III. Medium-Sized Countries. These include Senegal, Ghana, Zimbabwe, and 
Uganda, where there are two or more faculties of agriculture and several M.Sc.-
degree programs. Donor support is needed to improve the scientific infrastructure and 
shore up the quality of the graduate programs. 
 
Level IV. Large countries with Ph.D. capacity. South Africa, Ethiopia, and Nigeria 
are examples of countries with numerous masters’ degree programs and some Ph.D. 
programs serving national and pan-African markets. Universities in these countries 
are typically understaffed with regard to senior academics, and their needs for 
support include ICT, library, and sabbatical-leave compensation. Several donors may 
be needed for each country.   32
 
Level V. Regional Centers of M.Sc. and Ph.D. Specialization. New regional degree 
programs include the proposed master’s degree specialization in agricultural 
economics that will train students in their home university for one year and a regional 
location for the second year. Twelve countries in eastern, central, and southern 
Africa, representing 16 departments of agricultural economics, have designed this 
program. Other regional programs include summer institutes and support to expand 
the innovative Forum for Agricultural Resource Husbandry—which strengthens the 
M.Sc.-thesis research of students in eastern and southern Africa—to other parts of the 
continent.  
 
Level VI. Post-Conflict Countries. Special attention should be given to rehabilitating 
universities in war-torn countries such as the Sudan, Angola, and Sierra Leone.   33
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